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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE MILITARY - AMERICA V.
CHINA: AN ESSAY ON THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS,
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
Erin Michele Baxtert
I. TO DIE OR NOT TO DIE
Capital punishment has been used since the beginning of recorded
history as a means of punishing wrongdoers. There is no nation in our
world that has not, at one point in its history, used this form of punish-
ment. Over time, the areas of the world that continue using corporal pun-
ishment have changed. The types of governments that have utilized cor-
poral punishment have changed as well. Additionally, the crimes that are
punished by a death sentence have also varied. It is interesting to note
that in most countries, the military system has its own form of govern-
ment, rules, regulations, judiciaries and punishments. Ironically, the judi-
ciary system of a military assemblage of a particular country does not
always mimic the country's own system.
In this article, I will discuss the differences between the United
States Military's and the Chinese Military's conception and assessment
on capital punishment. I will evaluate both countries' military laws and
usage of the death penalty, past and present, and show the similarities and
differences between the two. I will reflect on the policy considerations for
the utilization of such punishments, consider the negative aspects, the
positive aspects and the equality of the apportioning. However, I will first
describe in a broad overview the history of military justice systems.
The general functions of a system of military law are to govern the
persons within the military and to maintain discipline so as to assure the
accomplishment of assigned tasks. Military law has both a broad and a
narrow sense. It has been defined as: "body of law governing members of
1 Legal Specialist, 71 Delta, United States Army. When Ms. Baxter served as legal specialist
in the United States Army, she developed an interest in the military's utilization of the death pen-
alty. B.S. Business Management, University of South Florida, J.D. University of Tulsa, Dec.
2000.
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the military services, distinguished from martial law."' Another definition
of military law is that in its wider sense, it includes that law which, op-
erative only in times of war or like emergencies, regulates the relations of
enemies and authorizes military government and martial law.2
There is documentation of military judges existing as early as the
Roman Empire, at a time when Roman soldiers were subject to the abso-
lute will of their commanders.3 After the Norman Conquest in England,
military justice was a matter of Royal prerogative.4 Richard Coeur de
Lion's Ordinance of 1190 deterred sedition among his crusaders by disci-
plining the accused with "a series of penalties ranging from fines and ig-
nominious expulsion from the army, to tarring and feathering, loss of a
hand, and burial alive."5 In 1385, Richard II circulated the first extensive
articles of war.6 The Articles of 1385 "punished a variety of military of-
fenses, such as disobedience of orders, pillage, and theft . . . with penal-
ties that progressed from amputation of the left ear for minor transgres-
sion to handing, drawing and beheading" for major offenses.7 More intri-
cate and less barbaric military codes were realized in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. The codes8 promulgated by military commanders
serving under royal commissions were not uniform or rigid, rather "each
war, each expedition had its own edict" whose jurisdiction was limited to
that particular expedition.9 It is important to note that these codes gov-
erned only the conduct of soldiers during wartime. However, in times of
peace, "the Common Law made no distinction between the crimes of sol-
diers and those of civilians.... [A]I1 subjects were tried alike by the same
civil court."'0
William and Mary were in need of a standing army and a source to
1. GILBERT'S LAW DICTIONARY 162 (1st ed. 1994).
2. See WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILrrARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 5, ch. I (2d ed. Reprint
1920).
3. See The awareness that the king or other war commander could exert unlimited pow-
ers of subjugation in the command of his troops was shared by Medieval law and Roman
law. See JOSEPH W. BISHOP, JR., JUSTICE UNDER FIRE 3-4 (1974).




8. Examples of these codes include the Articles of War of the Free Netherlands of 1590
and Gustavus Adolphus's Articles of War of 1621. See BISHOP, supra note 3. Gustavus's
Articles of War of 1621 contained 167 articles and provided for formal court-marital pro-
ceeding. This is the first documentation of formal court marital proceeding. Gustavus' Arti-
cles inaugurated the history of modem military justice. See id. at 5. In effect, they formalized
recognition of the four moral virtues necessary to any army: order, discipline, obedience and
justice, and are the foundation of military justice today. See id. at 4.
9. GREAT BRITAIN WAR OFFICE, MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW 1914-18 (1914).
10. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 42 n.44 (1955).
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assure its discipline; therefore, they accepted the Bill of Rights, and Par-
liamentary law began to govern military justice in 1689." The Bill of
Rights required Parliament's consent to the raising and keeping of armies.
The Mutiny Act was passed by Parliament in 1689, which provided for
the establishment of a standing army as well as provisions for its disci-
pline.'2 However, Courts-martial were given a very restricted jurisdiction
by The Mutiny Act.'3 Courts-martial jurisdiction applied only to regular
soldiers, and they only applied to strictly military offenses - sedition, de-
sertion and mutiny.'4
II. UNITED STATES MILITARY LAW IN THE BEGINNING
The United States military justice system was in existence several
hundred years prior to the adoption of the United States Constitution."5
The Framers of the United States Constitution were observant of the lim-
its Parliament set on the peacetime jurisdiction of courts-martial over
capital crimes. The framers fostered a great distrust of military tribunals
as they had been controlled by the revelry of military power in the colo-
nies. Therefore, they were acutely aware of the perils of the domineering
military justice systen. 6 Many problem areas were cited within the Dec-
laration of Independence and they consisted of the following: the submis-
siveness of civil power to the military, the quartering of troops during
peace time, and the authorizing of incalculable cruelties performed
through the hand of the King's mercenaries.' 7 Coincidentally, one reason
the Revolutionary War was fought was to protest the standing armies. 8
The "standing army" debate, which took place at the Constitutional Con-
vention, was a debate to determine whether to have a standing army or a
militia. 9 This debate was derived from the experiences of the Revolu-
11. See BISHOP, supra note 3, at 6.
12. See id. at 8.
13. See id. THE MuTNY ACT OF 1689 stated that "noe Man may be forejudged of Life of
Limbe or subjected to any kinde of punishment by Martiall Law or in any other manner then
by the Judgment of his Peeres, and according to the Knowne and Established Laws of this
Realme.... Soldiers... who shall desert Their Majestyes Service be brought to a more Ex-
emplary and speedy Punishment than the usuall Forms of Laws will allow .... See id. at 7.
14. See id. at 8.
15. See generally Nicole E. Jaeger, Supreme Court Review: Maybe Soldiers Have Rights
After All, 87 J. CRINM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 895-96 (1997).
16. See Reid v. Covert, supra note 10, at 16.
17. See Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 183-84
(1962).
18. See id.
19. "[S]tanding army" can be understood as a permanent, professional peacetime army. In
contrast, a militia, or "armed citizenry" was composed of "free independent citizens that
1999]
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tionary War. As United States citizens had opposed and rebelled against
the oppressive British Rule, many harbored severe anxiety regarding the
subsistence of a peacetime army.
20
On the other hand, many citizens saw the very existence of the war
as clear evidence that the new nation was in the need of a strong standing
army." The need for a standing army was a thought on the front burner
for the Founding Fathers in 1775 when they passed the first legislation of
the Continental Congress, which dealt extensively with discipline in the
military.22 While the Framers made it known that they distrusted the no-
tion of a standing army, they did see the greater need to authorize a na-
tional armed force. They did this by adopting- the American Articles of
War, which authorized the national armed force and provided for a means
to discipline the troops swiftly and without the required formalities of
civilian justice."
The Framers carefully diffused the war powers between the three
separate branches of government, probably because of their distrust of
unmitigated military power.24 A separate court system was provided for
the armed forces, and Article III did not include military courts.25 Instead,
Congress established courts-martial26 under its Article I powers,27 which
would band together to defend themselves as necessary; as soon as peace was restored, they
would return to their homes and regular occupation." Stephanie A. Levin, The Deference
That is Due: Rethinking the Jurisprudence of Judicial Deference to the Military, 35 VILL. L.
REv. 1009, 1023-24 (1990). In modem terms, a militia is similar to the reserve components
of the military.
20. See id. The standing army debate was between the federalists, who favored a profes-
sional military, and the anti-federalists, who favored a militia. See id. at 1023-24.
21. See id. at 1030.
22. See 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1775, June 30, 1775 (1905) at 111.
23. See Warren, supra note 17, at 184 (quoting Madison, Federalist No. 41, at 251 (Lodge
ed. 1888)). The American Articles of War were based on the British Articles of War, which,
in turn, had their origin in the military codes promulgated by King Gustavus in 1621.
BISHOP, supra note 3, at 5. The Articles of War underwent major amendments in 1776, 1786,
1806, 1874, 1916, 1920 and 1948. Of the changes, there was a reduction in the number of
members requisite to assemble a general court-martial, changes in the specification of offi-
cers authorized to convoke court-martial, and the addition of a field officer court-marital,
precursor of the summary court-martial. David Schlueter, The Court-Martial: A Historical
Survey, 87 MiL. L. REv. 129, 131-44 (1980).
24. See Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 139-40 (1953). The Founders recognized that the
exigencies of military discipline would require a different balance of individual rights and
government interests than is appropriate for civilian society.
25. See id at 140. Article 1I is the Article which established the federal judiciary.
26. A court-martial is a military court for both trying and punishing military offenses and
those common law crimes provided for in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). See
generally CHARLES A. SHANOR & TIMOTHY P. TERRELL, MILITARY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 80-
95 (1980). The jurisdiction is entirely penal and disciplinary; only criminal charges are tried
[Vol. 7:227
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grant Congress the authority to make rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces.28 The assurance of disciplined
troops was historically the function of the military justice system, and the
tool to instill fear was the court-martial.29 That tool was at the com-
mander's complete discretion, and was used to instill fear and obedience
in his soldiers. Commanders of the military accepted and vigorously de-
fended the brutal nature of military justice because it was determined that
in order to be effective, military justice must be swift and harsh."0 While
it was clear that there were some extreme deficiencies in the military jus-
tice system, interest in reform did not develop for almost another
century.
31
Brigadier General Samuel T. Ansell, the acting Judge Advocate
General of the Army, advocated a radical revision to the 1916 Articles of
War in the early part of the twentieth century.32 Ansell was extremely
critical of the Army's lack of uniformity regarding disciplinary actions
and sentencing and the lack of a formal appeals process for courts-martial
convictions. 33 Therefore, he advocated the creation of a centralized man-
datory review system in the form of an appellate tribunal, as well as for
the creation of uniformity in the judicial system.' 4 However, Ansell's
proposals were not adopted in the 1920 Articles, and this was largely due
to the opposition from the Provost Marshall General Crowder, the princi-
pal author of the 1916 Articles and an outspoken defender of the then-
existing system. 3
by court-martial, and the court-martial must have jurisdiction over the person and the of-
fense. See id.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 14.
28. See generally Steven J. Carroll, A Proposalfor Streamlining the Military Justice Sys-
tem, 36 NAVAL L. REV. 187 (1986).
29. See id.
30. See BISHOP, supra note 3, at 21. For example, in an attempt to combat desertion during
the Revolution War, General George Washington ordered public execution of deserters with
mandatory attendance by the members of the condemned soldier's unit. This was in an at-
tempt to emphasize the gravity of the offense. Andrew M. Ferris, Military Justice: Removing
the Probability of Unfairness, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 439, 446 (1994).
31. See John O'Brien wrote a treatise on military law while he was a lieutenant in the
Army. He advocated for a complete revision of the American Articles of War to make the
military justice system more compatible with a republican form of government. See Ferris,
supra note 30, at 447.
32. See General S.T. Ansell was a principal influence in the evolution of our now-existent
system of military discipline. See generally Terry Brown, The Crowder-Ansell Dispute: The
Emergence of General Samuel T. Ansell, 35 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1967).
33. See id at 4.
34. See id.
35. See Frederic I. Lederer & Barbara S. Hundley, Needed: An Independent Military
Judiciary - A Proposal to Amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 3 WM. & MARY BELL
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The need for a change became more apparent during World War II.
A number in excess of sixteen million men and women volunteered, or
were drafted into, active military service.36 Tales of grave injustices were
purported by the tens of thousands of citizens who had been subjected to
the military's system of discipline during the more than two million
courts-martial.37 This far-reaching displeasure with the military justice
system finally instigated a movement towards reform, which took place
in the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) in
1950.38 Since the adoption of the Articles of War by the Continental Con-
gress in 1775, the execution of the UCMJ presented the first momentous
alteration in the management of military discipline in the American
armed forces. As Professor Edmund Morgan, the primary drafter of the
UCMJ, had served under General Ansell, many of the proposals sug-
gested by General Ansell four decades earlier were incorporated into the
UCMJ.39 In addition to bringing uniformity to the armed forces by way of
procedural and substantive law,' the UCMJ also created a centralized
review panel in each of the armed forces that had jurisdiction to hear the
appeals from defendants whose sentences had reached certain jurisdic-
tional thresholds.4 Also created by the UCMJ was a three member panel
of civilian judges who had the jurisdiction to hear mandatory appeals re-
garding all death penalty cases.42
The UCMJ governed the military throughout the Korean War and
into the 1960's without any significant changes. However, in 1968, Con-
gress enacted the Military Justice Act of 1968."3 Congress enacted this
RTs. J. 629, 636-37 (1994).
36. See Keith M. Harrison, Be All You Can Be (Without the Protection of the Constitu-
tion), 8 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 221, 227 (1991).
37. See Ferris, supra note 30, at 450.
38. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940.
39. See Lederer & Hundley, supra note 35, at 636.
40. Prior to the UCMJ, each branch of the military was regulated by a different set of
laws. The conduct of Army soldiers was regulated by the Articles of War; sailors and ma-
rines were regulated by Articles for the Governance of the Navy; and Coast Guard was
regulated by yet other laws. The Air Force had been independent of the Army until 1947, and
the existing Articles of War were made applicable to the Air Force in 1948. Now, all military
branches are regulated by the UCMJ. See generally id.
41. An original requirement in the UCMJ was that any sentence that included the death
penalty was to be reviewed by a Board of Review. See id. However, in 1968, the Board of
Review was re-named as the Courts of Military Review. Review of a death penalty sentence
is now mandatory. See Military Justice Act of 1968, 10 U.S.C. § 861 (1988).
42. The three person panel was increased to a five person panel by Congress in the 1989.
Defense Authorization Act. See id.
43. See Walter T. Cox, The Twenty-Seventh Annual Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture: Echoes
and Expectations: One Judge's View, 159 Mu, L. REv. 183, 187 (1999). Chief Judge Walter
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new Act during a time when there were several societal and judicial is-
sues affecting our nation, one of which was the Civil Rights movement.
Some of the most important military bases were surrounded by com-
pletely segregated communities. a While it is true that President Truman
had integrated the military almost two decades earlier, the majority of
communities rejected integration.4" This was also an era in which the
Vietnam was escalating, and there were a great number of angry protest-
ers. These protesters were members of not only the civilian sector, but
also the military sector.' Due to the environment, it is no surprise that
Congress became interested in improving the military justice system.
Thus, there were some significant changes made under the Military Jus-
tice Act of 1968.
III. CHINESE MILiTARY LAW IN THE BEGINNING
The relationship of the United States with the People's Republic of
China (PRC) has progressed from one of armed conflict to the present
alliance of limited, yet incipient, cooperation within the last thirty-five
years. As China's armed forces are the most massive in the world, its
study is of great interest as well as great importance.47 With a military so
large, surprisingly little has been printed about its military legal system.
However, there are several reasons for such a lack of written information,
and they are as follows: (1) the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) dis-
placed virtually all law by rule through policies and directives; (2) there
is extreme sensitivity in the PRC regarding "state secrets;" and (3) many
of the military legal documents are considered classified; therefore, rela-
tively few have emerged from China.'
Of particular interest is the Chinese People's Liberation Army's
(PLA) theory and employment of capital punishment for crimes commit-
ted by soldiers and tried by the courts of the PLA. But, it is first important
to understand the military system as a whole. The Chinese PLA's military
regulations are based on political sentience and warrant that the revolu-
T. Cox currently serves in the US Army Judge Advocate General Corps, and he wrote of his
experiences in the JAG Corps, especially during times of change.
44. See id. at 188.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. The last available count of the members of the armed forces of the PRC, collectively
entitled the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), done in 1996, had a total strength of
2,950,000. 71.5% of this number was army, 11.9% was navy and 16.6% was air force. See
Captain David C. Rodearmel, Military Law in Communist China: Development, Structure
and Function, 119 MiL. L. REv. 1 n.1 (1988).
48. However, of the documents that have been published, such as source documents and
accounts of military trials, an adequate representation may be realized. See generally id.
1999]
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tionary line will be carried out.49 The principal functions of the Chinese
Communist Military legal system are twofold: (1) to sustain an elevated
degree of political oneness between the CCP and the PLA, and (2) to
maintain military order and discipline, thereby increasing the overall
military potential.5" The military legal system has not only had the task of
maintaining order and discipline within the PLA, it has also been respon-
sible for governing the civil sector during both times of drastic political
change and periods of crisis.5 Additionally, the legal authority for large
areas of Communist China has been comprised of the Military Tribunals
of Military Control Committees during significant periods of its history,
when conditions of martial law prevailed.52
It is vital to obtain a rudimentary understanding of some key con-
cepts within the broader setting of traditional Chinese law in order to un-
derstand the role of the military legal system of Communist China. The
military legal system of Communist China consists of both communist
law and Chinese law. 3 While it is true that the legal system of the PRC
has drawn heavily upon Soviet sources, it still retains many of the dis-
tinctive features of China's own legal heritage.'
Traditional China was guided primarily by the Confucian philoso-
phy: upright and benevolent personal behavior and proper observance of
social relationships produced societal order and well being. 5 The belief
was that upright behavior on the part of individuals would bring order
and harmony to each family, and that in turn would lead to order and
harmony in the states (making them well-governed), which would lead to
order and harmony in the world - world peace.56 This overall behavior
was governed by 1i - the moral code or customary law of China.57 Confu-
cius expressed the preference for moral persuasion as opposed by rule by
harsh punishment and formalized codes. He said if a society regulates by
the use of penalties when laws are broken, this would serve as a deterrent
to avoid jail. Yet, this form of moral code will deter persons from having
a sense of shame. In order for people to be truly good, they must have a
sense of shame. This can be accomplished by leading people by virtue
49. See generally KIm HYUNG I, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTS OF CHINA AND THE
WEST: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1981).
50. See Rodearmel, supra note 47, at 2.
51. See id. at 2-3.
52. See generally JEROME ALAN COHEN, THE DYNAMICS OF CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS
(1970).
53. See Rodearmel, supra note 47, at 3.
54. See id. at 3.






and to restrain them by the rules of decorus (li).5"
The Confucian philosophy was opposed by the Legalist school of
thought, which favored a ruthless punitive system of positive law (fa)59 in
order to sustain public tranquility and establish a strong state. The legal-
ists disparaged 1i as being a volatile basis for government since the 1i are
unwritten, particularistic, and subject to arbitrary interpretation.6'
The Confucian philosophy did eventually prevail as the origin of tra-
ditional Chinese society; however, facets of legalism were also inte-
grated. The laws were primarily penal in nature, used to penalize viola-
tions of the codified Confucian ethical norms.6' Yet, the law was rarely
utilized to uphold these norms; the law was only needed when moral per-
suasion and societal pressure failed. Laws that only affected an individual
were rarely used. There was a stronger focus on the laws that, if broken,
violated the entire social order, and ultimately, the entire harmony within
the world.62 The belief that disastrous natural phenomena - floods,
droughts, tempest, insects and pests - were the consequence of human
disorder provided further theoretical justification for punishment of
wrongdoers; they were a double menace to society.63
China law differs greatly from that in the United States. There was
no concept that the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty.' 4
Also, the principle of equality before the law did not exist; rather, differ-
ing treatment was accorded based on the relative class and social status of
the offender and the victim.65 Additionally, voluntary surrender and con-
fession, to keep with Confucian beliefs, were highly encouraged and
could be a mitigating factor in criminal cases. 6' As a matter of fact, tor-
ture was an acceptable means of procuring a confession during trials un-
der the penal code of the Ch'ing dynasty. 67 Failure to confess, on the
other hand, was generally seen as obstinacy and could be equivalent to an
58. See generally JACQUES GUILLERMAZ, A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
(Anne Destenay trans.) (1972).
59. For an exposition of the meaning and functions of li and fa, see Benjamin Schwartz,
On Attitudes Toward Law in China, in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW AND THE INDIVIDUAL (M.
Katz ed. 1957), reprinted in JEROME ALAN COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE PEOPLES
REPUBLIC OF CtINA, 1949-63 62 (1968) [hereinafter COHEN].
60. See DERK BODDE & CLARENCE MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 23 (1967).
61. See Rodearmel, supra note 47, at 4.
62. See generally id.
63. See Bodde, supra note 60.
64. See Michael Thieme, The Debate on the Presumption of Innocence in the People's
Republic of China, 10 Rev. Socialist L. 277 (1984).
65. See BODDE, supra note 60, at 33.
66. See generally W. Allyn Rickett, Voluntary Surrender and Confession in Chinese Law:
The Problem of Continuity, 30 J. OF ASIAN STUD. 797 (1971).
67. See generally BODDE, supra note 60. The Ch'ing dynasty reigned form 1644 - 1912.
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aggravating factor in criminal cases.6' Another difference was that if the
laws did not specifically speak to a given offense or penalty, a magistrate
had the authorization to apply another statute by analogy.69 Finally, there
were no defense attorneys to assist the accused.7" The laws penalized as
disrupters of harmony both those who encouraged others to bring about
court actions, as well as those who benefited from them; therefore, the
development of a legal profession was problematic. 71
Within the imperial legal codes, there was a separate section devoted
to regulating the military.72 There was a section, the fifth division of the
Ta Ch'ing Lu-li, which was devoted to military laws. These laws pun-
ished offenses such as divulging state military secrets, 74 unauthorized sale
of military material75 and desertion.76 If the military law was not abided
by, officers had the authority to adjudge eighty blows with a bamboo
stick to the offender; furthermore, if there was a second offense, the offi-
cer was authorized to administer up to one hundred blows.77 Yet, if an
officer punished too harshly, he could be punished for the crime of ex-
citing and causing rebellion by oppressive conduct, which is also a capital
offense.78 A death sentence to an officer under these circumstances could
only be executed after two years imprisonment.7 However, oftentimes
the offender was pardoned or had his sentence reduced during this period.
There were other more serious crimes which called for immediate execu-
tion.
There was not a great dissimilarity between civilian law and military
law within the imperial system. There were no courts or tribunals dedi-
cated to the military. Military defendants, as well as civilian defendants,
were tried before the standard court system under the supervision of the
imperial government's Board of Punishments. 0 For example, in 1807 the
Department for Kuangtung of the Board of Punishments sentenced Naval
First Captain Ch'en P'an-kuei to sixty blows with the heavy bamboo in
addition to one year of penal servitude. This sentence was imposed for
68. See Rickett, supra note 66.
69. See BODDE, supra note 60, at ch. VI.
70. See id. at 69.
71. See Rodearmel, supra note 47, at 5.
72. See id. at 7.
73. See id at n.31.
74. See id. at n.32.
75. See id at n.33.
76. See Rodearmel, supra note 47, at 7 n.34.
77. See id at n.35.
78. See id at 7.
79. See id. at u.36.
80. See generally BODDE, supra note 60. Three representative trials of military defendants
in the civilian court system are reported.
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diverting funds from his sailors' payroll to repair his ship's sails and
other equipment. These acts were in violation of the Ch'ing code's prohi-
bitions on exceeding authorizations for expenditures. He was tried in the
same courts as civilians. However, because none of the funds had been
directed for his personal use, and because he had restored them the
Board recommended to the Board of War that Ch'en be reinstated to his
office and that his punishment be remitted."1
Another example of a war crime heard in a general court is as fol-
lows: a sergeant of the military, Sergeant Li Ch'ung-shen, unlawfully
attempted to mediate a debt dispute in the Chihli province. In an attempt
to force a confession, Sergeant Li ordered his soldiers to beat one of the
parties, Kuo Fu-jen, and his son. Kuo was so enraged, he hung himself.
Sergeant Li was sentenced to one hundred blows with the heavy bamboo,
three years of penal servitude and payment of ten ounces of silver to the
family for funeral expenses. The soldier who followed the order and beat
Kuo was also punished. He received eighty blows of the heavy bamboo
for doing what ought not be done.82
Not only were military members adjudged in general state courts, but
punishment under the Military Laws of the Ch'ing code was not limited
to members of the military.83 Some of the Military Laws for which civil-
ians could be punished were as follows: crossing a border without exami-
nation at a government border post;' divulging state secrets;85 purchasing
military material sold without authorization; 6 and harboring deserters."
Additionally, military personnel were also subjected to punishment under
laws other than those listed under the Military Laws.
81. See id. at 478-80.
82. See id. at 458-60.
83. See Rodearmel, supra note 47, at 7.
84. See generally id. The penalty for such a crime consisted of one hundred blows and
three years' imprisonment. The punishment could be increased to death by strangulation after
two years' imprisonment if the offender had communicated with foreign nations beyond the
borders. Additionally, officers and guards who knew of the unauthorized border crossing, or
they were not vigilant at their post, could suffer similar penalties.
85. See generally id. After two years imprisonment, death by beheading was the punish-
ment for divulging military dispositions and plans to an enemy. The wrongful opening and
reading of any sealed government or official correspondence was punishable by sixty blows.
If the correspondence related to any important military affairs, the punishment was increased
to one hundred blows and three years banishment as a divulger of state secrets, even though
there is no requirement in the law that the secrets be shared with another.
86. See generally id. The unauthorized purchase carried a lesser penalty. If the article
purchased was not prohibited, such as a weapon, the punishment was forty blows. However,
purchasing prohibited articles meant punishment of eighty to one hundred blows and perpet-
ual banishment to a distance of 3,000 li.
87. See generally id. The punishment for harboring a deserter is one hundred blows and
military banishment.
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For many years, the Military Law was not only for military mem-
bers, and it was not heard in military tribunals. There were many different
dynasties throughout the years, yet no changes were drastic. However,
there was a need, however, for a separation of the military and civilian
legal systems. The changes slowly began to take place, and then finally
the separation was reinforced by the 1943 Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border
Region Statute Protecting Human and Property Rights.8 The statute pro-
vided that except in periods of martial law, non military personnel who
commit crimes will not be tried by military law.89 Additionally, the stat-
ute provided for numerous other procedural safeguard for both the mili-
tary and civilian legal systems. The right to appeal was allowed.' ° Of
great importance, cases involving the death penalty were to be reviewed
and approved by the central border region government before execution,
even if no appeal was filed.9 However, there is an exception for emer-
gency wartime situations.92 There was a provision for speediness, specifi-
cally, that arrested persons and any evidence is to be brought to the Pub-
lic Security Bureau within twenty four hours of the arrest,93 and judicial
procedures were to be completed within thirty days of having received
it.94
Military trials during this time were conducted publicly, and they
tended to be rather informal in procedure. There was no yelling or
screaming from the on-lookers; however, they were free to question the
accused during the proceeding. The defendant and the witnesses testified,
and the judge asked questions of them.
By the end of this period, the Chinese Communist military legal
system had undergone considerable development, both substantively and
procedurally. The military legal system became functionally differenti-
ated from the civilian system as its jurisdiction over civilians and civilian
offenses was continuously reduced. There were periods where, during
turmoil, the military laws governed civilians. However, it was determined
that the separation was better.
A separate formal system of military courts was established by the
1954 Constitution and the organic laws enacted under its authority. In
addition to establishing a Supreme People's Court and local people's
courts, the Constitution provided for military courts as part of a system of
88. See generally DAVID BACHMAN, THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE CHINESE
COMMUNIST PARTY, Nov. 1992.





94. See generally COHEN, supra note 59.
95. See Rodearmel, supra note 47, at 32.
[Vol. 7:227
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
"special courts." 96 The Organic Law of the People's Courts,97 adopted one
day after the Constitution was proclaimed, specified the establishment of
military courts as one of the special courts.9 Military procuracies were
also authorized under the provision for special people's procuracies of the
Organic Law of the People's Procuratorates. 9 While it is true that both
statutes specified that the organization of military courts and procedures
would be prescribed separately by the National People's Congress,'"0 no
such acts have been published in the official Collection of Laws and
Regulations of the People's Republic of China.'° If they truly were en-
acted, they are probably regulated and classified under the broad 1951
Regulation for the Preservation of State Secrets.
Military courts were organized in each of the country's eleven Mili-
tary Regions and at the Military Provincial District level."° The military
courts tried a variety of cases involving contradictions between members
and the enemy or criminal elements who violated criminal law.103 A
functionally specialized class of judge advocate officers to carry out legal
duties was provided for in the Regulations on the Service of Officers."
While the military courts post-1954 were modernized and regulated,
they also exposed several distinctive aspects retained from the traditional
Chinese and early Communist judicial systems. First, the established pen-
chant for procuring confessions is evident. The related traditional practice
of granting leniency for repentance shown after confession is also re-
tained. °5 Finally, the court applied the traditional principle of analogy by
citing the analogy article of the Statute on Punishing Counterrevolution-
aries as one of the bases for its judgement."°
Lesser offenses were normally handled within local military units, as
96. XLANFA [Constitution of the People's Republic of China] art. 73 (1954) cited in
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL DOCUMENTS OF COMMUNIST CHINA 34 (A. Blaustein ed. 1962).
97. ORGANIC LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S COURTS OF THE PR (1954). Id. at 131 [hereinafter
ORGANIC LAW].
98. See generally XANFA, supra note 96, at 34.
99. See generally ORGANIC LAW, supra note 97, at 144.
100. Id.
101. See VINCENT S. GREEN, EXTREME JUSTICE, ch. 5 (1995).
102. See GUILLERMAZ, supra note 58.
103. See generally CHINESE COMMUNIST AFFAIRS, FACTS AND FEATURES (1969).
104. See Rodearmel, supra note 47, at 39.
105. This practice is codified in Article 14 of the Statute on Punishing Counterrevolution-
aries: persons who have committed crimes specified in this Statute may be treated leniently,
their punishment may be mitigated or may be completely exempted from punishment if one
of the following circumstances exists: 1) they voluntarily appear before the people's gov-
ernment; admit their guilt, and sincerely repent of their crimes; 2) before the discovery or
investigation of a crime, or after it, they frankly confess to what they have done and are sin-
cerely repentant and by their selfless work atone for the crime. See id generally.
106. See id. at 41.
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opposed to going through the military courts. The handling of inter-
military discipline was a joint responsibility of the commander of the unit
and the unit political commissar. 07
During the Cultural Revolutionary Period of 1966-1976, changes
occurred once again. The military jurisdiction was extended to include
the civilian sector. However, this period was very short lived.' O8 The next
move was to that of complete Communist Party control.
During this tine, reference in case law was not based upon any
written laws or regulations. Instead, the focus was in accordance with
party policy."°9 There also was no mention made of the crime of the ac-
cused. Rather, a lenient sentence was given for crimes, which the defen-
dant confessed to, and more severe treatment was threatened for "those
who resist."11 These policies discourage an accused from attempting a
defense or challenging any evidence presented by the authorities.
The formal military legal system was not spared during the Cultural
Revolution. The military courts and procuracies were basically "disman-
tled," and it was not officially revived until October of 1978.1
Until 1982, the PLA had never operated under a unified criminal
code governing military crimes." 2 However, such a code was needed,
according to the PLA General Political Department, for four key reasons.
Those reasons are as follows: 1) strengthen the army legal system; 2) cor-
rectly punish servicemen for their criminal offenses against their duties;
3) educate the large numbers of commanders and fighters in strictly
abiding by the state's laws and honestly executing their duties; and 4)
consolidate and enhance the army's combat effectiveness." 3
The PRC Provisional Regulations on Punishing Servicemen Who
Commit Offenses Against Their Duties, which the NPC Standing Com-
mittee adopted as a military criminal law on June 10, 1981, was imple-
mented on January 1, 1982."' While most military matters were handled
as state secrets in the past, this law was announced and published in the
press. The new military criminal law was adopted as a supplement and
continuation of the Criminal Law to cover crimes committed by service-
men that are not written into the Criminal Law.
Serious violations of the Military criminal law may be punished by
107. See id.
108. See id. at 42.
109. Rodearmel, supra note 47, at 47.
110. Id.
111. See id
112. See generally Major Darla P. Wollschlaeger, OTJAG's China Initiatives: Past, Pres-
ent, Future, 1998 -Jut ARMY L. 55 (1998).
113. Xinhua News Agency, Explanation of Regulations, June 10, 1981, translated in For-
eign Broadcast Information Service, June 12, 1981, at K4.
114. See Rodearmel, supra note 47, at 57.
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the military courts. If there was only a minor offense of the military
criminal law, that offense would likely be handled in accordance with
military discipline. 
115
IV. DEATH PENALTY IN THE US MILITARY
Since the first American Articles of War in 1775, Congress allowed
court-martial jurisdiction for service members for non-military crimes,
yet limited the authority to all crimes that were not capital. 6 In order to
construe the meaning of "not capital," Colonel Winthrop, referred to as
the Blackstone of Military Law," 7 stated that the Articles deliberately
debarred from the jurisdiction of courts-martial all capital crimes of offi-
cers or soldiers, no matter under what circumstances they are committed.
It mattered not if they were against military persons or civilians. Capital
crimes are to be understood as crimes punishable by death by the com-
mon law, or by statute of the United States, for example: murder, arson or
rape."1
8
During the Civil War, however, the military was granted the author-
ity (by Congress) to try a service member for the civilian offense of
capital murder." 9 However, this new statute was limited, and the mili-
tary's jurisdiction only extended to times "of war, insurrection, or rebel-
lion." 20 This statute had no application when the "the civil courts were
open and in the undisturbed exercise of its jurisdiction.""12 The Court
further restricted the application of the jurisdiction of courts-martial by
indicating that in order for a non-military offense to be tried by the mili-
tary, the offense had to be one that prejudiced good order and
discipline. 12
Changes occurred once again in 1916 when Congress extended
courts-martial jurisdiction to specified non-military offenses, such as lar-
ceny, robbery and assault. There was no requirement of prejudice of good
order and discipline. 23 Congress took a look at the death penalty during
the same time and explicitly provided that murder and rape were punish-
115. See id.
116. See WINTHROP, supra note 2, at ch. XXV.
117. See Reid v. Covert, supra note 10, at 19 n.38.
118. See WINTHROP, supra note 2, at 721.
119. See Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228, 233 (1959).
120. Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 513 (1878).
121. Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376, 386 (1920) (quoting Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S.
509, 515 (1978)).
122. See Exparte Mason, 105 U.S. 696, 698 (1882) (stating that the graveness of the mili-
tary offense was not simply an assault with intent to kill, but an assault by a soldier on duty
with intent to kill afederal prisoner which he was standing guard (emphasis added)).
123. See WINTHROP, supra note 2, at ch. XXV.
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able by death in a court-martial; however, it further provided that no per-
son shall be tried by court-martial for murder or rape committed within
the geographical limits of the States of the Union and the District of Co-
lumbia in time of peace. 24 Although the Articles were revised in 1920,
there was no change made to the jurisdiction of courts-martial regarding
capital offenses until the enactment of the UCMJ. The UCMJ extended
the military's jurisdiction to try service members for murder and rape
within the geographical limits of the United Stated for capital offenses in
peacetime. "2
While at first blush it may appear that US service-members would be
given the same rights and liberties as civilians, established through the
Constitution of the United States, this is not the case. For example, it is
unclear how the Eighth Amendment applies to the military. The question
of the Eight Amendment's applicability is generally focused on the type
of punishment permissible.'26 It is ironic that the men and women who
defend the constitutional rights enjoyed by Americans are themselves
deprived of some of those rights.
In 1973, the D.C. Circuit reviewed a military death sentence that had
been commuted to life imprisonment. 2 7 In dicta, the court noted that
Furman2" had not invalidated the military sentencing statute, article
118.129 On appeal, the Supreme Court did not decide this question specifi-
cally, but indicated that the Furman concern of the arbitrariness might not
be a problem in military courts. 30
Thus far, there has been one military appellate court to review the
124. See id.
125. See 10 U.S.C. § 918 (1994).
126. See 10 U.S.C. § 855 (stating that punishment by flogging, or by branding, marking or
tattooing on the body, or any other cruel or unusual punishment may not be adjudged by any
court-martial or inflicted upon a person subject to this chapter.).
127. See Schick v. Reed, 483 F.2d 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1973), aff'd, 419 U.S. 256 (1974).
128. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). This case regards the eighth amendment
issue of cruel and unusual punishment. Furman invalidated the statutory capital punishment
schemes of three states because the sentencing portions did not guard against arbitrary and
capricious imposition of the death penalty.
129. See generally Shick v. Reed, 419 U.S 256 (1974).
130. See id. "Does Furman apply to death sentences imposed by military courts where the
asserted vagaries of juries are not present in other criminal cases? Our disposition of the case
will make it unnecessary to reach this question." Id. at 260. However, Justice Marshall ar-
gued the very opposite. He argued for the Furman applicability and stated:
[n]othing in Furman suggests that it is inapplicable to the military. The
per curium carves out no exception to the prohibition against discretionary
death sentences. The opinions of the five-member majority recognize no
basis for excluding the members of the Armed Forces from protection
against this form of punishment.
Id. at 271 n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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constitutionality of the UCMJ on capital sentencing schemes. That court
assumed without question that the concerns of Funnan do apply in mili-
tary courts.'3 1 The Court of Military Appeals (hereinafter CMA) affirma-
tively stated that the Bill of Rights applies to the military personnel, as
well as civilian citizens. The Matthews3 ' case involved a general court
martial sentencing a Private First Class to death for the rape and murder
of an American civilian in Germany. The court looked to determine if the
crimes which Matthews committed had any "characteristics which, for
purposes of applying the prohibition against 'cruel and unusual punish-
ments' distinguish them from similar crimes tried regularly in State and
Federal courts."' 33 The Court determined that there was no "military ne-
cessity" for distinguishing the courts-martial capital sentencing proce-
dures from their civilian counterparts; therefore, the CMA applied the
Supreme Court precedent to the military justice system.1"
Upon reviewing Supreme Court precedent, the Matthews court found
that constitutionally valid death penalty statutes shared certain common
features. Those features include: 1) bifurcated sentencing procedure; 2)
the presence of aggravating factors; and 3) the opportunity for the defen-
dant to present unlimited extenuation and mitigation evidence. 135 The
CMA based their analysis on these features, and while they held most of
the death penalty procedures followed by the courts-martial as valid, they
did find one fundamental defect. Neither the UCMJ nor the Rules for
Court-Martial (RCM) requires that courts-martial members "specifically
identify the aggravating factors upon which they have relied in choosing
to impose the death penalty."' 36 Due to this defect, the Court reversed
Matthews' death sentence. The Court stated, in dicta, that Congress or the
President could lawfully and easily remedy the defect in the UCMJ capi-
tal sentencing scheme.'37 That defect was ultimately corrected by the
President by promulgating the RCM 1004.138 The specific purpose of
RCM 1004 was to correct the deficiency by enumerating established pro-
cedures for capital cases,'39 including a list of aggravating factors which
131. See United States v. Matthews, 13 MJ. 501, 521 (A.C.M.R. 1982).
132. See United States v. Matthews, 16 MJ. 354, 359, 361 (C.M.A. 1980).
133. Id. at 369.
134. See il at 369, 377-78.
135. See id at 377.
136. Id. at 379.
137. Matthews, 16 M.J. at 380-82.
138. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (1995 ed.) [hereinafter MANUAL].
Ironically, Rules for Court-Martial (RCM) 1004 ha! been circulated for public comment
prior to the Matthews decision, and it was cited in the Matthews opinion. Matthews, 16 M.J.
at 381.
139. RCM 1004 requires a unanimous finding that the accused is guilty of a capital offense
before a death sentence may be imposed. RCM 1004(a)(2). This, of course, should sound
1999]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
determine death penalty eligibility:
the offense was committed before the enemy, except in the case of
rape or murder; the accused knowingly created a grave risk to national
security or mission accomplishment; the offense caused substantial
damage to national security, except in the case of rape or murder the
offense substantially endangered the lives of persons other than the
victim, except in the case of aiding the enemy, espionage, or rape; the
accused intended to avoid hazardous duty; in the case of rape or mur-
der, the offense was committed in time of war; in the case of pre-
meditated murder: (a) the accused was serving a sentence of thirty
years of more at the time of the murder; (b) the murder was committed
while the accused was engaged in the commission or attempted com-
mission of robbery, rape, aggravated arson, sodomy, burglary, kidnap-
ping, mutiny, sedition, or piracy of an aircraft or vessel; (c) the murder
was committed to receive money or value; (d) the accused procured
another person to commit the murder; (e) the murder was committed
to avoid apprehension; (f) the victim was the President, a member of
Congress, a U.S. Judge, or the head of a foreign state; (g) the accused
knew the victim was a member of civilian law enforcement or of
military rank of noncommissioned officer or above; (h) the murder
was committed with the intent to obstruct justice; (i) the murder was
preceded by the intentional infliction of substantial mental or physical
harm to the victim; or (j) the accused had been found guilty in the
same case of another murder specification. 140
In the case of a violation of Article 118 (4), the accused was the ac-
tual perpetrator of the killing; in the case of rape: (a) the victim was under
the age of twelve, or (b) the accused maimed or attempted to kill the vic-
tim; if death is authorized under the law of war for the offense; or in the
case of aiding the enemy or espionage, the accused had received a prior
life or death sentence involving espionage or treason, or the accused
knowingly created a grave risk of death to a person other than the
victim.
similar as this is what is utilized in civilian courts. The Rule also requires unanimous finding
that at least one aggravating factor is present, and that any extenuating or mitigation circum-
stances are substantially outweighed by any admissible aggravating factor. RCM
1004(b)(4)(A). Additionally, the Rule provides that the accused is to have broad latitude in
extenuation and mitigation, RCM 1004(b)(3), and is entitled to have members of the courts-
martial instructed to consider all such evidence before deciding upon a sentence of death.
RCM 1004(b)(6). This, again, is very similar to what is practiced in civilian courts.
140. See RCM 1004(c).




Specifically within the UCMJ, the imposition of the death penalty
can be permitted for eleven purely military offenses and three traditional
common law crimes. The military offenses include: 1) desertion in time
of war;142 2) assaulting a superior commissioned officer in time of war; 143
3) mutiny or sedition;'" 4) misbehavior by a subordinate compelling sur-
render; 45 5) improper use of a countersign in time of war;' 6) forcing a
safeguard;'47 7) aiding the enemy; 48 8) spying in time of war;49 9) espio-
nage; 5' 10) misbehavior of a sentinel in time of war;' 5' and 11) willfully
disobeying a superior commissioned officer in time of war. 152 Those three
crimes authorized under the UCMJ which are traditionally common law
crimes are as follows: 1) premeditated murder; 53 2) felony murder;"5 and
3) rape.115 Of the fourteen listed offenses, wartime spying is the only one
that carries a mandatory death penalty. All others carry a permissive
death penalty, namely: premeditated murder, murder committed in the
course of certain felonies, rape, mutiny, certain types of espionage and
certain other wartime offenses.5 6 Strangely, with all the current excite-
ment regarding the death penalty issues, Congress has not revised the
death sentencing provision of the UCMJ since the Code was enacted.
Private First Class (PFC) John Arthur Bennett, at age nineteen, was
sentenced to death by a court-martial. He was tried and convicted of rape
and attempted murder of an eleven year old Austrian girl.'57 Seven years
later PFC Bennett, United States Army, requested fried shrimp, peaches,
hot rolls, and biscuits for his last meal.'58 A few hours after dinner, just
after midnight on April 13, 1961, Bennett's life came to an end. He fell
from a rain-drenched scaffold with a hangman's noose tightened around
his neck. He held on to life for sixteen minutes and five seconds, and then
142. See 10 U.S.C. § 855
143. See id. §890.
144. See idt §894.
145. See id. §801.
146. See id.
147. See idt §802.
148. See id. §803
149. See id. §806.
150. See idt §806 (a).
151. See id. §913.
152. See idt §890.
153. See id §918.
154. See id.
155. See id. § 920.
156. See R.C.M. 1004 (b)(1).
157. See generally Cody M. Weston, United States v. Loving: The Resurrection of Military
Capital Punishment, 77 OR. L. REv. 365 (1998).
158. See id.
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he died. 159 His death marked the last United States Military execution for
quite some time.
The United States military executed one hundred and sixty service
members from 1930 to 1961." However, from 1961 to 1989, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) heard very few
death penalty cases. Since the enactment of UCMJ, the military has exe-
cuted ten service members. 61 Of those cases heard, there were four with
significant importance. 62  One of these cases, United States v.
Matthews, 163 held that the military death penalty scheme of the time was
unconstitutional under the Supreme Court capital punishment decision of
Furman v. Georgia.
64
The first in a series of cases regarding the death sentence was United
States V. Curtis.165 A central issue in this case was whether Congress
could delegate to the President the authority to proscribe the rules and
procedures for death sentences in the military. The Curtis case was re-
manded to the Navy-Marine Cerps Court of Military Review."66 Finally,
in 1997, the five-judge Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces167 reversed
Curtis's death sentence, for other reasons.16
8
While it is true that the Curtis case was the seminal decision regard-
ing constitutional questions of capital punishment, it was the case of
United States v. Loving, '69 in 1994, that first made its way to the Supreme
159. Richard A. Serrano, Last Soldier to Die at Leavenworth Hanged on an April Storm,
L.A. TMES, JULY 12, 1994, at A14.
160. See National Institute of Justice Reports, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Pro-
grams, 1991.
161. See Cynthia Swarthout Conners, The Death Penalty in Military Courts: Constitution-
ally Imposed?, 30 UCLA L. REV 366, 404 (1982). The first nine executions were for murder,
occurring over a condensed time period from 1954 to 1959 and then Bennett's 1961 execu-
tion was for rape. See id. at 369 n.18.
162. See United States v. Hutchinson, 18 M.J. 281 (C.M.A. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
981 (C.M.A. 1984) (the United States Court of Military Appeals was redesignated the CAAF
in 1994); United States v. Rojas, 17 MJ. 154 (C.M.A. 1984); United States v. Matthews, 16
MJ. 354 (C.M.A. 1983); United States v. Kemp, 13 C.M.A. 89, 32 C.M.R. 89 (1962).
163. See Matthews, 16 M.J. 354. Army Private First Class Wyatt Matthews had received a
death sentence for the rape and murder of an American civilian in Germany.
164. See Furman v. Georgia, supra note 128 (holding a civilian death sentence unconstitu-
tional under the Eighth Amendment because the sentence was imposed arbitrarily).
165. See United States v. Curtis, 33 M.J. 101, 110 (C.M.A. 1991).
166. See id.
167. On the fifth of October, 1994, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1995 changed the name of the U.S. Court of Military Appeals to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces.
168. See United States v. Curtis, 46 M.J. 129, 130 (C.A.A.F.1997).
169. See United States v. Loving, 41 M.J. 213 (1994); Loving v. United States, 577 U.S.
748 (1996).
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Court. The Supreme Court affirmed Loving's death sentence and ap-
proved the death penalty rules and procedures adopted by the President in
the Manual for Courts-Martial. Additionally, the Court recognized that
the military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate
discipline from that of the civilian, and the President can be entrusted to
determine what limitations and conditions on punishment are best suited
to preserve that special discipline. 70 It seems appropriate that the Presi-
dent should have a part in determining what is best for military justice.
He is, after all, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Addition-
ally, it is important to note that the Framers of our Constitution did not
want the military justice system to have enormous power; they preferred
the safeguards as they were leery of a standing army.
With United States v. Loving, 7 ' the Supreme Court smoothed the
path for what could be the military's first execution in thirty-eight years.
In Loving, the court espoused the constitutionality of the restructured,
post-Matthews military capital punishment method, which grants the
President, pursuant to congressional delegation, the power to stipulate
aggravating factors in military capital murder cases.'72
The facts of Loving are as follows: On the evening of December 11,
Loving robbed a 7-Eleven store at gunpoint. Roughly an hour later, he
robbed a second 7-Eleven store at gunpoint. He was displeased with the
small sums of money he obtained during the robbery, so he decided to
rob taxicab drivers. Subsequently, the next night, he got in a taxicab
around 8:00 p.m. The driver was an active-duty soldier who was taxi
driving for extra money. He robbed the driver and then shot him in the
back of the head two times. A mere fifteen minutes later, Loving called
another taxicab to pick him up from his barracks. Again, he robbed the
driver, this time a retired Army sergeant, and shot him in the head. Lov-
ing then went to a nightclub with his girlfriend. However, his felonious
night was not over. Yet a third incident ensued. Loving had a taxicab
driver drop off his girlfriend at home, and he then robbed the third driver.
This driver believed he was about to be killed; therefore, he wrestled the
pistol away from Loving and attempted to shoot him. However, the
weapon did not fire, and the driver fled the scene. Loving chased the
driver in order to regain his pistol, he regained the gun, and then went to
his girlfriend's house for the rest of the night. 73
With the help of Howard Harrison, the escaped taxicab driver, the
civilian and military police arrested Loving. Among other charges, a
170. See United States v. Loving, 577 U.S. 748, 773 (1996).
171. See id.
172. See id. President Reagan responded to the Matthews analysis of Furman by detailing
categories of aggravating factors adequate for imposing a military death penalty for murder.
173. See United States v. Loving, supra note 169, at 231.
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military court-martial found Loving guilty of both premeditated murder
and felony murder,174 violations of Article 118 of the UCMJ.175As three
aggravating factors were found, the court-martial unanimously sentenced
him to death. The three aggravating factors consisted of: 1) committing
premeditated murder during the commission of a robbery; 2) acting as
triggerman in a felony murder; and 3) being found guilty of premeditated
murder and then being found guilty of a second murder in the same
case.176 Private Loving's commanding officer approved the findings and
sentence of the court-martial. 171
The United States Army Court of Military Review rejected a plethora
of appellate issues and affirmed the death sentence in two separate opin-
ions.178 Loving's arguments also failed before the CAAF. 179 Loving's last
chance was to be heard by the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court did
grant certiorari 8 ° on the specific contention that the Eighth Amendment 81
and the doctrine of separation of powers prevents Congress from delega-
tion to the President the determination of aggravating factors that warrant
a military death penalty.182
Joined by five other Justices and three concurring opinions, Justice
Kennedy concluded that the congressional delegation of the implementa-
tion of the military capital punishment scheme to the President violated
neither the Eighth Amendment nor the separation of powers doctrine. 83
Throughout this opinion, Justice Kennedy interwove rationales drawn
from three primary sources: the history and precedent of (1) the delega-
tion doctrine; (2) capital punishment; and (3) military discipline. It is
clear that the military discipline arguments carried the most weight, with
the Court only paying lip service to the first two sources.
The military death penalty practice has been carefully structured "to
make sure there is no arbitrary imposition of the death penalty in the
military."' In her opinion in one of the Curtis cases, Judge Crawford
listed eight significant protections built into the rules. The enforcement of
174. Seeid at 229-31.
175. See 10 U.S.C. § 918.
176. According to the Rule of Courts-Martial 1004 (a) (2), a military death sentence must
be a unanimous decision. In Loving, this was not a problem.
177. United States v. Loving, 577 U.S. 748 (1996).
178. Id.
179. United Stated v. Loving, 41 M.J. at 232, 241, 297. Loving argued seventy errors
which ranged from improper voting procedures during sentencing to ineffective counsel to a
defective court-martial order. Id.
180. See Loving v. United States, 515 U.S. 1191 (1995).
181. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("cruel and unusual punishments" shall not be inflicted).
182. See United States v. Loving, 517 U.S. 748 (1996).
183. See id.
184. United States v. Curtis, supra note 166, at 166.
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the protections will ensure the death penalty is not imposed arbitrarily.'
An adjudged death sentence must withstand close, and often times pro-
longed, scrutiny. All adjudged finding and sentences of court-martial (all
courts-martial, not just death sentence cases) must be reviewed by the
commanding officer of the accused, or the commanding officer's re-
placement, who convened the court."6 All approved death sentences are
automatically reviewed by the military appellate courts.8 7 Presidential
approval is also required before a death sentence can be executed pursu-
ant to Article 71 (a) of the UCMJ. 188 There has not been presidential ap-
proval on any military death sentence since President Eisenhower ap-
proved Bennett's sentence in 1957.189 The only subsequent military death
penalty case to even reach the President was commuted to life imprison-
ment by President Kennedy in 1961.1 °
Despite all these layers of procedural protection, a service member
legally could have been executed until 1983, when the CAAF, in Mat-
thews, held that military capital punishment scheme of the time to be un-
constitutional under Furnan.'9' However, it is important to note that
changes were made in order to ensure the military capital punishment
scheme is once again constitutional. Therefore, the sentence is still a le-
gally and constitutionally sound one, assuming the Courts can overcome
all the hurdles placed in front of it. With the 1972 Furman decision, the
Supreme Court initiated a line of jurisprudence that has consistently in-
validated arbitrary and capricious impositions of the death penalty. The
Court stated that a capital sentencing scheme must genuinely narrow the
class of persons eligible for the death penalty and reasonably justify a
death sentence for a defendant when compared to others convicted of the
same capital crime.' 92 In light of this jurisprudence, Matthews reversed a
death sentence because neither the UCMJ nor the RCM required a spe-
185. See id at 166-67.
186. See 10 U.S.C. § 860. Convening authorities can approve, disapprove, or reduce the
findings and sentences of courts-martial. Id.
187. A death sentence must first be reviewed by the relevant service branch's court of
criminal appeals. See 10 U.S.C. § 866(b)(1). If the sentence is affirmed, the CAAF must
review the case. See 10 U.S.C. § 867(a)(1).
188. See 10 U.S.C. § 871 (a). The president may commute, remit, or suspend the sentence
as he sees fit.
189. See Captain Dwight H. Sullivan, The Last Line of Defense: Federal Habeas Review of
Military Death Penalty Cases, 144 Mm. L. REv 1, 3-4 (1994).
190. See generally id.
191. See Matthews, 16 M.J. 354.
192. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). No specific rationale com-
manded a majority in Furman. For examples of subsequent decisions that followed Furman
guidance, see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976);
Gregg v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 153 (1976).
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cific identification of aggravating factors upon which court-martial mem-
bers relied in determining a death sentence.'93 However, as discussed ear-
lier this procedural problem was remedied with the enactment of the
Manual for Courts-Martial.
V. THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE CHINESE MILITARY
Within the military in China, it is not uncommon to see the death
penalty utilized. There are several crimes for which this punishment will
be applied. During the early days of military law, the death penalty was
not looked upon fondly. Military law, which was synonymous with ci-
vilian law, followed the Confucius Code. The Chinese did not choose to
use harsh treatment; they instead desired to change behavior by pressures
from the general community."9 If a person is executed, he cannot repent
and repay his debt to society, therefore, this form of discipline was not
popular. However, it was used in times where moral pressures would not
work and there was no chance of repentance.
However, that was early law in China. Under the Provisional Regu-
lations of the PRC on Punishing Servicemen who Commit Offenses
Against their Duties, adopted June 6, 1981, which became effective Janu-
ary 1, 1982,195 there are several crimes listed which depict the death pen-
alty as the punishment. For example, stealing or collecting or furnishing
secrets to enemies is punishable by death, even during peacetime. An-
other example is obstructing the performance of the duty of others,
thereby causing severe injury or death. A final example is sabotage,
which carries with it a death sentence. 196
It is ironic that today, the death penalty is frequently used in the Peo-
ple's Republic of China. However, the moral and legal code of the past
explicitly forbade such harsh penalties. The Code of Confucius is clearly
no longer followed as a way of life in modern day China.
VI. CONCLUSION
As is evident, The Chinese Military and the United States Military
have different positions regarding the sentence of the death penalty. The
different opinions are obvious due to the background of the two coun-
tries. Both the military background and the judicial system background of
the countries indicate the basis for the views the countries hold.
The United States Government was leery of the existence of a
193. Matthews, 16 M.J. at 356.
194. See discussion supra Part mI.
195. See Rodearmel, supra note 47, at 58.
196. See id
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standing army ever since the formation of it, so it is not a surprise to re-
alize that the military must have final approval from the President of the
United States prior to following through with corporal punishment. The
U.S. government does not want to give too much power to the military
courts, just as they were distrusting of relinquishing that power in the
past. Yet, when more power rested in the hands of the military, the use of
the death penalty was more prevalent. Similarly, in times of war, the
U.S. military is granted more leeway, and they more frequently employ
the death penalty.
The Chinese military, on the other hand, holds most of the country's
power. In the past, China shied away from corporal punishment because
the Code of Confucius disagreed with it. However, as time passed, power
shifted to the military, and the military mind set prevailed. The code in
the military was and is to harshly punish wrongdoers. That is why we see
the utilization of the death penalty to be more prevalent in the Chinese
military.

